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FRANK v. MARYLAND
Health Inspections Of Private Homes
Frank v. Maryland'
Because of a large quantity of debris and rat droppings
outside Frank's decaying house, a Baltimore health in-
spector searching for the source of a neighborhood rat
infestation demanded to examine Frank's basement. Frank
refused to admit the inspector until he obtained a search
warrant. Subsequently Frank was tried and convicted be-
fore a Police Justice for violating Article 12, Section 120,
of the Baltimore City Code, which imposes a fine on any
homeowner who refuses to admit a health inspector having
reason to suspect a nuisance exists in the house. Failing
to gain acquittal on appeal to the Criminal Court of Bal-
timore and certiorari being denied, by the Maryland Court
of Appeals, Frank appealed his case to the Supreme Court.
Since Wolf v. Colorado3 settled that the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Fourth
Amendment4 to the Constitution of the United States ex-
",Senator Keating, on January 19, 1960, Introduced Senate Resolution
235, which proposed a select committee to investigate and recommend
new legislation in this area relating to the jurisdiction of federal courts
over civilians employed by or accompanying our armed forces overseas. At
this writing, the resolution is in the hands of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
1359 U.S. 360 (1959).
2 (Flack, 1950) :
"Whenever the Commissioner of Health shall have cause to suspect
that a nuisance exists in any house, cellar or enclosure, he may
demand entry therein in the day time, and if 'the owner or occupier
shall refuse or delay to open the same and admit a free examination,
he shall forfeit and pay for every such refusal the sum of Twenty
Dollars."
'338 U.S. 25 (1949), noted 38 Calif. L. Rev. 498 (1950).
' "The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
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tends to the States through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' the precise issue presented to the
Supreme Court was whether a State health inspection of
a private home at a reasonable time without a search war-
rant constituted a prohibited search. The Court, in a five
to four decision, held that it did not.
The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
analyzed the background and implementation of the
Fourth Amendment and concluded that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
arose historically as a safeguard against the police search
for evidence of crime; and, although it may be used to
protect more broadly than its history indicates, it never-
theless does not pertain to health inspections made to
protect the general welfare as distinguished from enforcing
the criminal law, if the intrusion on privacy is slight and
conducted within reasonable limits." Finally, the Court
concluded that if search warrants, were required for health
inspections, the rigorous constitutional requirements for
their issue would prevent the making of many needed in-
spections.7
Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Black and Brennan, dissented on the ground that
any search of a private home without a search warrant is
unreasonable, absent exceptional circumstances such as
fire, or police observation of the entry of a fugitive. The
dissent also maintained that requiring search warrants for
health inspections would not interfere with enforcement
of modern health standards.
The question of the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment to a health inspection, of a private home by a Federal
officer without a warrant was considered for the first time
in 1949 by the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in District of Columbia v. Little.! The Court held that
"No. State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
By holding that the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not extend to such health inspections, the Court did not
have to decide whether an inspection Is a search. District of Columbia
v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13, 13 A.L.R. 2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1949), noted 38
Geo. L.J. 139 (1949), held that it is. Contra, Sunderman v. Warnken,
251 Wis. 471, 29 N.W. 2d 496 (1947).
1 Mr. Justice Whittaker, one of the majority Justices, filed a separate
one paragraph opinion stating that he concurred in the Court's opinion
with the understanding It held the Fourth Amendment prohibition against
unreasonable searches applied to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that in the instant case the search was reasonable.




the protection of the Fourth Amendment applies to health
inspections made by Federal officers to protect the general
welfare and, applying the exceptional circumstances test
as a test of reasonableness, concluded that health inspec-
tions of private homes without a warrant were unreason-
able.'
In the Frank case, the first case construing the applica-
bility of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to health inspections of private homes without a
warrant, the Court refused to adopt the holding of the
Little case. This refusal was based, in part, on a belief that
the history behind the Fourth Amendment established that
although it was, intended both to protect privacy and af-
ford self-protection, it was the self-protection, the right to
be secure from searches for evidence to be used in criminal
prosecutions, that inspired the struggles against unre-
stricted searches. The protection the Fourth Amendment
gives to privacy was held to be outweighed by the need
of the community for health inspections.
The Fourth Amendment protection against unreason-
able searches can be traced back to the English case of
Entick v. Carrington,"0 on which the Court in the Frank
case relied heavily. In that case, officers of the Crown
broke into Entick's home under authority of a general
executive warrant to search for evidence of utterance of
libel, a criminal offense. The Court, in a landmark deci-
sion in English constitutional development, held the search
unlawful. The precise holding of the Entick case was
thus limited to criminal actions, but the basis for the deci-
sion was the common law right of a man to privacy in
his home. That the Court would have been equally willing
to apply its holding to searches for evidence to be used in
civil actions is indicated by Lord Camden's opinion, for he
stated that there was no way for the processes of a court
to be used in civil cases to force evidence out of the owner's
custody.1' Certainly if processes could not be used in a
civil case to require the production of evidence known to
be in a person's possession, a search of his home could
not be based upon cause to believe that such evidence
might be discovered. The truth of the matter is that Lord
Camden apparently never contemplated the possibility
9 The decision was affirmed on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950).
10 19 Howell's State Trials, col. 1029 (1765).
'1 "There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has often been
tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or
fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no way to
get it back but by action." Ibid., 1073.
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that a search could be made other than for evidence for
use in a criminal prosecution. Yet the principles and rea-
soning of the Entick case are applicable to all searches,
no matter what the motive. It is a distortion of the Entick
case to regard it, as did the Court, as authority for the
proposition that special warrants for searches need not be
required when the search is not for evidence to be used
in a criminal prosecution.
Equal difficulties attend the Court's reliance on Boyd
v. United States.2 The Court quoted an excerpt from the
Boyd decision to the effect that the unreasonable searches
against which the Fourth Amendment gives protection are
almost always made in criminal cases."3 That factual
statement made in 1886 reflected the situation theretofore
prevailing and should not be regarded as an authoritative
guide on the applicability of the Amendment to the vastly
different and more complex situation existing today. More-
over, the qualification that the searches covered by the
protection are "almost always" made in criminal cases
is itself an explicit recognition, that at least some other
searches are also covered. Careful use of the Boyd case
thus calls for an examination to determine whether the
general statement or the exception is applicable. The
Boyd case itself involved a civil action. The Court there
held that compulsory production of papers under civil
process to forfeit property is the equivalent of an unrea-
sonable search and seizure. The opinion regarded the
protection of the Fourth Amendment as extending pri-
marily to criminal cases, but civil proceedings of a quasi-
criminal nature were held to be within its ambit. It would
have been consonant with such application to civil pro-
ceedings of a quasi-criminal nature to include inspections
of private homes where refusal to admit an inspector or
to abate a nuisance as directed by an inspector after ad-
mission constitutes a crime and can lead to a fine or im-
prisonment.
The Court cited no other cases in support of its conclu-
sion that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to health
inspections. The dissent cited the Little case 4 and Federal
Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co.'5 in support
of the wide application of the Fourth Amendment to civil
cases. In the American Tobacco case, the Court narrowly
1"116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Ibid., 634.
District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13, 13 A.L.R. 2d 954 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), noted 38 Geo. L.J. 139 (1949).
"264 U.S. 298, 32 A.L.R. 786 (1924).
[VOL. XX
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construed, the statutory powers of the Federal Trade Com-
mission in order to avoid having to decide whether any of
its powers conflicted with the Fourth Amendment. This
avoidance of the constitutional issue is not authority for
application of the Fourth Amendment to civil cases gen-
erally. Not only is it not authority, but there has been
a long and extensive line of cases 'holding the Fourth
Amendment not applicable to particular types of civil
cases, such as the issue of warrants in certain revenue
cases, 6 attachments under the Food and Drug Act, 7 and
seizures under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," but
none of these are comparable to a search of a private
home. Reliance should be placed on interpretation, of the
intent behind the Amendment, not on cases. The Court
chose to interpret the intent as conterminous with the
evils prompting the Amendment, while the dissent chose
to interpret the intent as the general one to protect pri-
vacy which motivated the fight leading to the constitu-
tional protections. Historically and analytically, the posi-
tion of the dissent that the protection of the Fourth
Amendment should reach health inspections, even though
made only to protect the general welfare, is sound.
Having concluded that the social need for health in-
spections had to be balanced only against a restricted
right of privacy, the extent of the infringement of Frank's
privacy was considered by the Court. Frank, of course,
had asked only that the inspector return with a search
warrant. The Court construed this request to be not
"admissible self-protection" but a "denial of any official
justification" for an inspection and an assertion of an
"absolute right to refuse consent for an inspection." How
a request that an inspector have a search warrant is a
denial of "any official justification" for an inspection is
difficult to see. A lesser claim to privacy would be hard to
imagine. In effect the Court held that assertions of a right
to privacy are unjustifiable in an area in which the com-
munity has an interest even though the right is constitu-
tionally protected.
In upholding the reasonableness of health inspections
made without a warrant, the Court also relied on the fact
that Maryland has sanctioned such inspections for over
200 years. However, the early Maryland statutes authoriz-
16 In re Meador, 16 Fed. Cas. 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1869).
'17 United States v. Eighteen Cases of Tuna Fish, 5 F. 2d 979 (W.D. Va.
1925).
IsUnited States v. 62 Packages, TEtc., 48 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1943),
aff'd., 142 F. 2d 107 (7th Cir. 1944).
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ing entry upon or inspection of ships, carriages, stores,
etc. without a warrant are not in point. The Baltimore
City Code provision under challenge itself derives from
an 1801 ordinance. 9 Thousands of inspections without
warrants were made under this ordinance and its succes-
sors, most of them being after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the Supreme Court in Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. 20 called
for repeated judicial acceptance before long practice would
indicate compatibility with due process, and Maryland has
no body of judicial opinion sanctioning health inspections
of private homes without a warrant. Without judicial ap-
proval, Maryland's history may not indicate common ac-
ceptance or compatibility with due process.
Analysis of the Court's opinion indicates that the con-
trolling factor was the imperative modern need for health
inspections. With modern knowledge of how diseases and
infections are spread, it is incontestable that adequate
control is impossible if inspections are delayed until there
are complaints or positive grounds for suspicion that a
nuisance exists.2 We are not faced, though, as the Court
seemed to feel, with the sole alternatives of allowing in-
spections without warrants or requiring warrants to issue
in all cases where needed. As the dissent pointed out, the
test of "probable cause" could even include the lapse of a
set period without a premise being inspected. This would
not, as the Court charged, represent use of "synthetic
search warrants." The requirement for a search warrant
in criminal cases is not designed to shield criminals or to
protect illegal activities, but to interpose an objective mind
between a possibly power-heavy official and individual
privacy.22 That need would seem to exist as much in re-
lation to health inspections as in detection of crime. A
magistrate, for example, could ensure that health inspec-
tions were not used to harass or as a means for looking for
evidence of crime without the need to meet the probable
cause test for a search warrant." There is a vast difference
BALTIMORE ORDINANCES, 1801-1802, No. 23, § 6.
S 18 How. 272 (U.S. 1855).
For an excellent discussion of the issue, see Stahl and Kuhn, In-
spections and the Fourth Amendment, 11 U. Pitts. L. Rev. 256 (1950).
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), noted 62 Harv. L. Rev.
1229 (1949) ; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), noted 37 Geo.
L.J. 270 (1949).
13 See State v. Pettiford, Daily Record, December 16, 1959 (Md. 1959).
A police officer assigned to make sanitation Inspections gained entry to
a private home under the guise of making a health inspection. His actual
purpose was to look for evidence of a lottery violation without having
to obtain *a search warrant. Lottery slips were found and seized. Sub-
[VOL. XX
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between broadening the grounds upon which a magistrate
may find probable cause to issue a warrant and dispensing
with a warrant altogether. Administrative agencies and
officers are constantly playing a larger and larger role in
our lives. It would appear sagacious not to unnecessarily
loosen constitutional restrictions on them at this date when
the full impact on our lives is yet to be seen.
Due to the reliance on Maryland history and to Mr.
Justice Whittaker's concurrence on the basis that the in-
stant search was reasonable, the Frank case does not
clarify the position the Court may take in deciding where
the Court will draw the line between allowed and pro-
hibited inspections without a warrant in future cases.
Indeed, just five weeks after the Frank decision, the Court
by a four to four vote noted probable jurisdiction in Ohio
v. Price2 4 to review on the merits an Ohio case sustaining
the constitutionality of health inspections of private homes
without a warrant. Mr. Justice Stewart excused himself
because his father had participated in the decision on the
Ohio Supreme Court. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan,
and Whittaker recorded their votes against noting juris-
diction to make clear that they thought the case was
clearly controlled by the Frank case and that there was
no retreat from the Frank decision. Mr. Justice Brennan
noted his view that plenary consideration might disclose
a fact situation so that the Frank case would not be con-
trolling.
In the Ohio case, Taylor refused to admit housing
inspectors to his home until they obtained a search war-
rant. Taylor was thereafter charged with violating Sec-
tion 806-30(a) of the Dayton, Ohio, Code of General Ordi-
nances and, in the absence of bail, held in jail awaiting
trial. Section 806-30(a) authorizes health inspections
without any requirement that the inspector even suspect
the existence of a proscribed condition.25 Acting on a
sequently the defendant was convicted of a lottery violation in a trial
in which the lottery slips were introduced as evidence. The Supreme
Bench granted a new trial on the grounds that a principal purpose of
'the entry of the health inspector was to search for evidence of a crime
without obtaining a warrant and that health inspections were not to be
used as a cover for such searches. A requirement of a warrant from a
magistrate could have prevented this abuse of health inspections and,
incidentally, saved the community from the expense of an invalid trial.
24360 U.S. 246 (1959).
2 "The Housing Inspector is hereby authorized and directed to make
inspections to determine the condition of dwellings . . . located within
the City of Dayton in order that he may perform his duty 'of safe-
guarding the healith and safety of the occupants of dwellings and
of the general public. For the purpose of making such inspections
and upon showing appropriate identification the Housing Inspector is
19601
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petition for habeas corpus filed on Taylor's behalf, the
State Common Pleas Court found the ordinance uncon-
stitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed, and- this
reversal was affirmed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court. The jurisdictional state-
ment, filed in February, 1959, stated the case was similar
to the Frank case and involved substantially the same
problems. The case was therefore held awaiting the decision
of the Frank case. Following that decision, jurisdiction, was
noted on June 8, 1959. Three memorandums were filed
with the order noting probable jurisdiction, one in support
of the order and two opposing the order. The supporting
memorandum indicated the justices voting to note proba-
ble jurisdiction thought a factual situation might be in-
volved that varied sufficiently from the situation in the
Frank case as to make the latter inapplicable, while the
opposing memorandums maintained that the court was
being asked in effect to reconsider its decision, in the Frank
case. This unusual filing of memorandums in connection
with an order setting an appeal for argument demon-
strated the sharp and bitter division of the Court.
Subsequently, the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court
was affirmed by an equally divided, Court.2" Mr. Justice
Brennan was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Black
and Douglas in a dissenting opinion which sought to dis-
tinguish the Ohio case on the facts. Specifically, the
opinion pointed out that in the Ohio case there was no
obvious unsanitary condition such as existed in the Frank
case. There was no showing, either, of suspicion or of
probable cause to believe a proscribed condition existed or
of a desire by the inspectors to make either a spot check or
a blanket check of homes in the vicinity. Thus it remains
to be seen whether the Frank case marks out a new area in
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or whether
it will be distinguished and limited in application.
JOHN MICixEMM
hereby authorized, to enter, examine and survey at any reasonable
hour all dwellings.... The owner or occupant of every dwelling ...
or the person in charge thereof, shall give the Housing Inspector free
access to such dwelling... at any reasonable hour for the purpose of
such inspection, examination and survey." *
Ohio v. Price .... U.S. 80 S. Ct. 1463 (1960).
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